effects of marriage and cohabitation on total family income. My goals are to compare men's and women's changes in financial status upon entering unions and to assess the relative contributions of adjustments in own income, income pooling, and changes in family size. Changes in own income that are due to intrahousehold specialization prove to be minor for both men and women relative to the effects of adding another adult's income to the family total. Women gain roughly 55% in needsadjusted, total family income, regardless of whether they cohabit or marry, whereas men's needsadjusted income levels remain unchanged when men make these same transitions.
n 2000, the median family income for married couples in the United States was $59,099, while the median income for single men and single women was $37,727 and $25,716, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2002) . Statistics such as these are often interpreted as evidence that it "pays" for both men and women to be married. Waite and Gallagher (2000:109) conveyed this view succinctly when they wrote, "Both men and women, it is fair to say, are financially better off because they marry. Men earn more and women have access to more of men's earnings."
Does marriage really confer financial benefits on both partners? From a theoretical perspective, the predicted effect of marriage on an individual's income is ambiguous. Consider the traditional behavior envisioned by Becker (1973 Becker ( , 1974 Becker ( , 1991 in which men specialize in market work and their wives specialize in home production. If the intrahousehold division of labor allows a man to be more productive at work, his earnings increase as a direct result of marrying. His effective income does not necessarily increase, however, because his earnings are now shared with his entire family. A married man is financially better off only if his earnings premium plus his wife's income contribution exceed increases in the family's need. Similarly, a woman benefits financially only if her husband's income compensates for her lost income as well as changes in the family's need. Becker's model predicts that both men and women gain "z-goods" produced within the household (and this gain, after all, is what motivates them to marry), but we cannot be sure that each partner's income increases.
It is straightforward to address this issue empirically by tracking men's and women's needs-adjusted family income as they transition into marriage. However, the empirical literature on income-related gains to marriage has focused on slightly different issues. Numerous studies (Cornwell and Rupert 1997; Daniel 1995a Daniel , 1995b Gray 1997; Korenman and Neumark 1991; Loh 1996; Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987; Stratton 2002) have examined the causal effect of marriage on men's wages. The consensus is that men receive a modest wage premium upon marrying, but this finding points only to the existence of intrahousehold specialization; it does not identify the effect of marriage on the financial status of men or women. Another set of studies (Bianchi, Subaiya, and Kahn 1999; Burkhauser et al. 1991; Duncan and Hoffman 1985; Smock, Manning, and Gupta 1999) have reversed the question posed here and have identified the effects of divorce on individuals' financial well-being. Numerous analysts have examined the link between marital status and the economic well-being of women with children (Budig and England 2001; Lichter, Graefe, and Brown 2003; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Spain and Bianchi 1996; Thomas and Sawhill 2002) . A comprehensive analysis of the effects of union formation on both men's and women's financial well-being is missing from the literature.
In the study presented here, I filled this gap in the empirical literature by using 1979-2000 data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to analyze changes in family income that are associated with transitions into first unions. First, I considered the income effects of both marriage and cohabitation. Given the prominence of cohabitation throughout the observation period (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Bumpass and Sweet 1989) , I was interested in learning whether the two types of unions yield different financial benefits. Second, I asked whether marriage and cohabitation cause income to increase, or whether it is simply the case that high-income individuals form unions. I exploited within-person variation in the data to isolate true income effects of union formation from the confounding effects of unobserved, time-invariant factors. Third, after identifying overall changes in individuals' needs-adjusted family income, I decomposed these changes into the portions that are due to (1) gaining or losing own income, (2) adding a partner's income to the family total, and (3) increased family size. My goal was to learn how the financial benefits to union formation and the sources of these benefits differ by gender.
BACKGROUND
Economic models of marriage (Becker 1973 (Becker , 1974 (Becker , 1991 Weiss 1997 ) demonstrate how marriage (and perhaps cohabitation) leads to financial gain. Individuals who meet in the marriage market are assumed to assess their combination of attributes, predict the benefit of joining forces, and marry if the expected gain represents their best alternative. 1 Although the gain to marriage can span many dimensions, economic models highlight the portion that is derived from the consumption of commodities that are produced within the household. Married couples receive consumption-related gains because they jointly consume public goods, pool risks, extend credit to one another, and/or engage in intrahousehold specialization that enables more goods to be produced-typically, by having the man specialize in market work and the woman concentrate on home production.
The magnitudes of these economic gains to marriage are intrinsically tied to market conditions. For example, the gain to specialization is expected to be positively correlated with the gap between the man's and woman's labor-market skills, while the gain to consuming public goods is expected to increase with the total family income. Both predictions gained relevance as technological change and other factors caused women's potential earnings to increase in the late twentieth century. Put simply, the marriage market no longer consists of "breadwinning" men and "homemaking" women. In light of this trend, theoretical attention has turned to the potential effects of women's increased employment and men's declining labor-market prospects on union-formation decisions (Becker 1991; Cherlin 1980; Mulligan and Rubinstein 2002; Oppenheimer 1988 Oppenheimer , 1994 Oppenheimer , 1997 .
An extensive literature is dedicated to confronting the models' predictions with the data. 2 I do not present a comprehensive survey, but it is worth noting that three distinct 1. Becker's (1973 Becker's ( , 1974 original formulation assumes that the information is perfect. Search-theoretic marriage models assume that the decision is made in an environment with imperfect information. See Pollack (2000) and Weiss (1997) for a comparison of these two approaches.
2. Although Becker's original model (1973 Becker's original model ( , 1974 does not formally distinguish between marriage and cohabitation (see Moffitt 2000 and Weiss 1997 on this point), one mission of empirical analysts is to determine whether the decisions to cohabit and marry differ. empirical approaches dominate the literature. Studies of assortative mating have looked directly at the choice of partners, typically by examining correlations among partners' attributes. These studies have addressed such issues as the effect of market conditions on the choice of partners (Lewis and Oppenheimer 2000; Mare 1991; Qian and Preston 1993) and differences in mating between married and cohabiting couples (Blackwell and Lichter 2000; Jepsen and Jepsen 2002; Schoen and Weinick 1993) . Another class of research has asked how union-formation decisions are affected by expected economic gains. In this approach-which can use either aggregate or individual-level data-marital states are the outcomes of interest, and proxies for expected gains to marriage or cohabitation are the key covariates. Reduced-form choice models of this type have included those by Brien (1997) ; Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar (2002) ; Smock and Manning (1997) ; and Xie et al. (2003) . A third type of study reverses the causality and models realized gains (e.g., men's wages) as a function of marital status and other covariates. My investigation belongs to this third class of empirical studies: I asked how individuals' log-income paths are affected by changes in marital status. In the remainder of this section, I focus on the "gains to marriage" literature.
No potential gain to marriage has received more empirical scrutiny than has men's wages, for analyses of the marriage-wage link provide a direct test of the economic model of marriage. If specialization occurs within marriages, then married men should invest more intensively than single men in marketable skills and subsequently receive more wage growth. Estimates of the productivity-enhancing effect of marriage on men's wages provide evidence that gains to specialization exist. However, the identification of this effect is nontrivial. While cross-sectional comparisons have invariably shown that married men have higher earnings than nonmarried men, this finding does not necessarily reflect the gain to specialization. An alternate explanation for the correlation is that men with relatively high levels of labor-market productivity are more likely than others to marry.
The standard strategy for distinguishing between selection and the causal, productivity-enhancing effects of marriage is to specify wage models that account for the endogeneity of marital status, often by assuming that decisions to marry are driven by unobserved, fixed effects. Most research in this vein has concluded that small productivity effects remain after selection effects are eliminated (Daniel 1995a (Daniel , 1995b Gray 1997; Korenman and Neumark 1991; Loh 1996; Stratton 2002) . Specifically, these studies have found that men's wage growth increases after marriage, which is consistent with married men investing more intensively than others in marketable skills. 3 In principle, the gains to specialization extend to any household in which adults work together to increase joint consumption. However, cohabiting men are likely to receive a smaller wage premium than are married men if cohabitors have inherently lower levels of trust, commitment, and expected union durations that make them less willing to undertake relationship-specific investments. It is well-established that union duration (whether anticipated by the couple or not) is shorter, on average, for cohabitors than for married couples (Bumpass and Sweet 1989) . South and Spitze (1994) reported a smaller malefemale difference in weekly hours of housework among cohabitors than among married counterparts. This evidence suggests that intrahousehold specialization and, in turn, the boost to men's wages may be less pronounced for cohabitors than for married couples. This prediction was supported by Daniel (1995a) and Stratton (2002) , who are among the few analysts to assess the causal effects of cohabitation on men's wages.
The literature on assortative mating offers an alternative empirical strategy for identifying intrahousehold specialization. Becker (1973 Becker ( , 1974 Becker ( , 1991 argued that husbands' and wives' potential wages should be negatively correlated if specialization occurs within marriages. The negative correlation arises from a couple's optimal sorting decisions (e.g., a man with high potential wages should seek a wife with low market productivity), as well as from investments in skills that are made during the marriage. However, Lam (1988) demonstrated that this prediction need not hold if the joint consumption of public goods is included among the gains to marriage. The gain to joint consumption is greater if the partners have similar demands for public goods, and the resulting incentive to pair with similar-skilled individuals may offset the specialization-driven incentive to sort negatively on market skills. In fact, empirical analysts have consistently found positive correlations among married couples' wages (Jepsen and Jepsen 2002; Nakosteen and Zimmer 2001; Smith 1979; Suen and Lui 1999) ; Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) found that cohabiting couples' wages are positively correlated as well. 4 There is ample evidence that intrahousehold specialization is becoming less pronounced across successive cohorts of married couples. Blackburn and Korenman (1994) , Cohen (2002) , and Gray (1997) reported that the male marriage premium has declined over time. Numerous analysts have documented the dramatic increases in married women's labor-market activities during the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Blau 1998; Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998; Goldin 1989; Spain and Bianchi 1996) . Both men and women have changed their work effort to the point that husbands' and wives' earnings are becoming increasingly positively correlated over time (Cancian, Danziger, and Gottschalk 1993; Juhn and Murphy 1997) . Using cross-sectional data for 1993, Winkler (1998) found that wives' annual earnings exceed their husbands' in 20% of dual-earner families and account for an average of 35% of the families' total earnings. Although husbands and wives tend to contribute more equally to family income than in earlier eras, specialization continues to be evident among couples with young children. Researchers who have controlled for the endogeneity of marital status and children have generally found negative effects of children on mothers' work effort and wages (Angrist and Evans 1998; Korenman and Neumark 1994; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Waldfogel 1997 ). Lundberg and Rose (2000) found corresponding increases in fathers' wages and work effort.
One lesson to be learned from these various studies is that the gains to union formation cannot be fully understood by focusing on intrahousehold specialization. Marriage and cohabitation decisions are driven by the partners' total expected gains, which are not limited to gains to specialization. As market forces lead couples to specialize less and collaborate more with respect to labor-market activities, men are increasingly likely to benefit financially from their partners' income contributions. With this lesson in mind, I focus on the "overall" income gain that men and women receive upon forming unions, and identify the contributions of partners' income and changes in own income to the overall gain.
Most studies that have explored the link between marital status and family income have focused on the well-being of women. One group of studies has demonstrated that single mothers are much more likely than are married mothers to live in poverty (Lichter et al. 2003; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Spain and Bianchi 1996; Thomas and Sawhill 2002) . These studies have presented cross-sectional evidence that women benefit financially from marriage but have paid relatively little attention to the distinction between selection effects (e.g., the fact that high-income women are more likely to attract partners) and causal effects of marriage. 4. By examining correlations in educational attainment, rather than wages, Schoen and Weinick (1993) purported to find evidence that cohabitors specialize less than do married couples. They showed that cohabiting couples are more educationally homogamous than are married couples and argued that this homagamy means that each partner makes a relatively equal contribution to the family's income. They did not test this prediction, which contradicts Becker's (1973) assertion that educational homogamy goes hand in hand with specialization insofar as highly schooled women are relatively more productive in the home. (Benham 1974 suggested that highly educated women are better able to augment their husbands' productivity.) Blackwell and Lichter (2000) reported that cohabitors are slightly less educationally homogamous than are married couples.
Another group of studies has examined the relationship between divorce and financial well-being. Using panel data, Bianchi et al. (1999) found that the median income-toneeds ratio for women is barely half that of men in the first year after married couples separate. Burkhauser et al. (1991) reported that the unconditional median loss in total income that is associated with divorce is 24% for women and only 6% for men. At the same time, numerous researchers (e.g., Duncan and Hoffman 1985; Smock et al. 1999) have demonstrated that remarriage goes a long way toward restoring women's economic well-being. In one of the few studies that controlled for self-selection into marriage, Smock et al. (1999) predicted the total family income for remarried women is more than twice the income level they would attain if they remained divorced, although it is not as high as the income level of women who never divorce. There appears to be little doubt that women benefit financially from being married, but additional evidence is needed on men's financial benefits and the distinction between cohabitation and marriage.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
I begin with the following model:
where ln Y it is the natural logarithm of income for individual i at time t, S it and C it are dummy variables indicating whether the individual is single or cohabiting at time t (with married the omitted category), and A it is the individual's age. Time-constant unobserved factors that explain variation in ln Y it are represented by ϕ i , while ε it represents timevarying unobservables. As written, Model 1 assumes that log-income paths evolve linearly as individuals age and shift up or down according to changes in marital status. In estimating each income model, I included a quartic function of age and a host of additional demographic and environmental shift factors (e.g., race, the presence of children, and calendar year); my goal was to use a flexible parameterization to minimize the chance that the estimated coefficients of marital status reflect the effects of omitted variables. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates of Model 1 identify differences in the predicted log income between individuals who are single and cohabiting (α c -α s ), cohabiting and married (-α c ), and single and married (-α s ). However, these estimates have at least two shortcomings. First, OLS does not identify the causal effect of changes in marital status on log income. If unobserved factors that are subsumed in ϕ i and ε it affect individuals' marriage and cohabitation decisions, then OLS estimates confound the value added of a change in status with the independent, income-enhancing or income-detracting effects of these unobservables. Second, Model 1 constrains the slope of the predicted age-income path to be independent of marital status. A change in marital status is assumed to cause a once-and-for-all change in log income, with no effect on subsequent growth in income. This restrictive assumption is inconsistent with evidence that men's wages-which typically account for a large share of family income-increase more rapidly among married men than among nonmarried men (Korenman and Neumark 1991; Stratton 2002) .
I relaxed the slope restrictions implicit in Model 1 with the following, more flexible specification:
where D it s , D it c , and D it m represent the duration at time t of single, cohabitation, and marriage spells, interacted with corresponding indicators of marital status. Model 2 allows log-income paths to vary in slope as well as levels across categories of marital status. The predicted, contemporaneous change in log income associated with a transition from cohabitation to marriage, for example, is -α c -γ c D c , where D c is the completed duration of the cohabitation spell; this predicted gap continues to grow or shrink by γ m D m as the marriage spell evolves. (An even more flexible specification that allows each state-specific slope to be nonlinear in duration proved to be unwarranted by the data.) Model 1 predicts this same gap to be a uniform -α c , regardless of the duration of each spell.
I addressed the endogeneity issue by differencing the data and using OLS to estimate the model
and so on. This transformation of the data eliminates ϕ i from the residual and leaves only within-person variation with which to identify the parameters of interest. As long as individuals' decisions to cohabit, marry, and remain single are driven only by time-constant unobservables, the difference estimators for α s , α c , γ s , γ c , and γ m are free from the endogeneity bias that is inherent in OLS estimators and can be interpreted as causal effects. To test the assumption that S it and C it are exogenous, conditional on the fixed effect, I used a test proposed by Heckman and Hotz (1989) and Wooldridge (2002) . I estimated a version of Eq.
(3) in which lead values of the controls for marital status (S it + τ and C it + τ ) are included among the regressors. If the estimated coefficients for these lead values are statistically significant, it must be due to correlation between the regressors and the (differenced) time-varying residual. If these estimated coefficients are jointly insignificant, I can conclude that the assumption of exogeneity is valid.
In light of the evidence discussed in the preceding section, I expect the effects of marital-status transitions on income paths to differ for men and women. However, there are exceptions. When cohabiting couples marry, changes in family income are identical for both adult members of the family. More generally, both members of cohabiting and married couples experience an identical growth in family income throughout the duration of the union. I estimated Models 1 and 2 for a pooled sample of men and women and interacted the regressors with a gender identifier to allow α s , α c , γ s , γ c , and γ m to differ for men and women. In specifications in which the dependent variable is total family income, I constrained α c , γ c , and γ m to be equal for men and women. 5 With the exception of coefficients for year dummy variables and the error variances, all other parameters in each model were allowed to vary with gender.
I computed both OLS and difference estimators for the parameters in Models 1 and 2. Because each individual contributes multiple observations to the sample, I computed robust standard errors that account for the nonindependence of observations within personspecific clusters.
DATA

Sample Selection
The data are from the 1979 NLSY (hereafter NLSY79). The NLSY79 began in 1979 with a sample of 12,686 men and women who were born from 1957 to 1964. The sample contained 6,111 individuals who formed a representative sample of the civilian, U.S. population in the targeted birth years; an oversample of 5,295 blacks, Hispanics, and economically disadvantaged whites; and a sample of 1,280 individuals who served in the military prior to the start of the survey. The respondents were interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially thereafter; I used data for all the interview years from 1979 to 2000.
5.
A small number of cohabiting-to-married transitions in the data are accompanied by changes in partners, so, in principle, I could identify different values of α c for men and women. In each specification, I failed to reject the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients using a 5% significance level.
My strategy for constructing a sample of person-year observations was dictated by the manner in which income was reported in the NLSY79. During every interview, the respondents detailed their annual income (by source) for the preceding calendar year. Respondents who were currently married or cohabiting reported their spouse's or partner's income as well. If a respondent cohabited with the same partner throughout 1990 but ended the relationship prior to the 1991 interview, for example, the income he or she reported that year does not reflect his or her partner's contribution to the total family income in 1990. Conversely, if the respondent cohabited with a single partner from October 1990 onward, in 1991 he or she reported his or her partner's 1990 income even though the two partners spent a relatively small portion of that year as a cohabiting couple.
To ensure that the respondents' reported family income matched their marital status in the preceding year, I proceeded as follows. First, I used information on marital status, starting dates for spells of marriage and cohabitation, and partner/spouse identifiers to determine when each partner-specific cohabitation and marriage began and ended. Second, I classified a respondent's status during each calendar year as cohabiting or married if the respondent spent at least 10 months with a single partner and as single if he or she spent at least 10 months without a partner. The remaining cases were classified as "mixed." Third, I determined the respondent's total family income (own income plus the spouse's or partner's, if applicable) for each calendar year using information reported during the next year's interview; married and cohabiting respondents still had to be living with the same spouse or partner for this information to be available. A given person-year remained in the sample if (1) the respondent was classified as single, cohabiting, or married; (2) the respondent's own income for the year and the spouse's or partner's income (if applicable) were reported to be between $100 and $1 million; (3) the respondent's 20th birthday preceded the end of the calendar year; and (4) the respondent had not yet dissolved his or her first marriage. 6 I used person-year observations that were two years apart to compute ∆ln Y it , ∆S it , and so forth for the differenced versions of Models 1 and 2. That is, I used lag-two differences of annual person-year observations for interview years 1979-1994 and lag-one differences of biannual observations for interview years 1996-2000. This strategy had two advantages, in that I handled the data uniformly throughout the period of observation and skipped the "mixed" years when the respondents changed their marital status. My sample consisted of 41,078 differenced person-year observations for 9,839 individuals. To estimate the levels (OLS) models, I "undifferenced" the data to obtain 50,917 observations for the same 9,839 individuals.
An unavoidable consequence of using data on annual income-especially two-year differences-is that short spells are excluded from the sample. The exclusion of short spells caused spells of cohabitation to be underrepresented in my sample because these spells tend to be shorter than marriages (Bumpass and Sweet 1989) . If individuals who experience short spells of cohabitation and marriage differ from others only in their timeinvariant, personal characteristics (e.g., if they have lower levels of commitment), then the omission of their spells does not pose a problem because I relied on within-person variation in the data. However, if the structural relationship between marital status and family income differs systematically with completed durations of spells-for instance, if unions in which one partner contributes relatively little to family income are less likely to last than are others-then the parameters I estimated do not necessarily reflect the relationships that prevail for the overall population. 6 . I eliminated about 1% of the observations by imposing $100 and $1 million cutoffs. A number of implausibly large income measures (on the order of $10 million) were reported by cohabitors, and these outliers would cause a significant increase in the estimated gain to cohabitation if they were left in the sample.
Measuring Income and Adult Equivalents
I used three alternative measures of income in estimating Models 1 and 2. Total family income (Y F ) is the sum of earnings (military income, wages, salary, tips, farm and business income), unemployment benefits, public assistance (Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income), educational benefits, veterans' benefits, child support, and "other income" received by the individual or couple during the calendar year. The definition of own income (Y 0 ) is less clear cut because certain sources of income (veterans' benefits, each form of public assistance, child support, and "other income") were not reported separately for individuals and their spouses. I defined own income to be the sum of the respondent's earnings, unemployment benefits, educational benefits, and these shared sources of income. The estimates reported in the next section are insensitive to whether Y 0 includes or excludes "shared" income.
The third dependent variable is total family income per adult equivalents (Y F / AE), or effective income. The value that a given income affords different families depends on the presence of children and the extent to which the families exploit scale economies. 7 To account for these cross-family differences, I used an adult equivalence scale proposed by Fuchs (1986a Fuchs ( , 1986b . The number of adult equivalents is a weighted sum of the number of adults and children in the family, where the first adult is weighted by 1, the second adult is weighted by 0.8, the first child is weighted by 0.4, and all subsequent children are weighted by 0.3. I also considered two alternative controls for family size. One is a measure proposed by Citro and Michael (1995) A second adult adds 0.68 in adult equivalents to a family with no children and 0.57 if two children are present; the first and second children add 0.46 and 0.42, respectively, assuming that two adults are present. The NRC measure always puts less weight on adults than does Fuchs's scale, and it puts more weight on additional children for families with no more than two adults and up to 14 children. My second alternative to Fuchs's scale defines adult equivalents as the total number of individuals in the family (A + C). By putting a weight of 1 on each family member, this per capita measure accounts for neither economies of scale nor age-specific differences in consumption.
Two additional comments are in order regarding the definition of family income per adult equivalent. First, because the numerator (Y F ) is restricted to income earned by the respondent and his or her spouse or partner, I included only those two adults and their children in the measures of adult equivalents. I wanted to focus on changes in financial status associated with gaining a partner (and possibly children), not on changes caused by additional reconfigurations of household composition.
Second, to use family income to assess individual well-being, it is necessary to account for the within-family allocation of income. By using total income per adult equivalent as a dependent variable, I assumed that couples share their needs-adjusted family income equally. This assumption is appropriate if family members jointly maximize a 7. These factors are unlikely to depend on whether a man and woman cohabit or marry, for the partners invariably pay for only one dwelling, one refrigerator, and so forth, regardless of their marital status. I am unaware of evidence that suggests that different adult equivalence scales should be used for cohabiting and married couples. common utility function, as in Becker's (1973 Becker's ( , 1991 decision-making framework. However, this aspect of Becker's model has received little empirical support. One prediction of the "unitary" model is that allocation decisions are affected by total family income, not by individual income-but this "income-pooling" hypothesis is rejected for samples of married couples (Browning et al. 1994; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Thomas 1990) , as well as cohabiting couples (Winkler 1997) . The data instead appear to support bargaining models (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981) and the efficient, collective decision-making framework proposed by Browning et al. (1994) . Although bargaining is widely acknowledged to occur within families, analysts have yet to identify parameters of household allocation that can be used to improve upon the equal-division rule that is implicit in "per capita" or "per adult equivalent" measures of income. Virtually all analysts have assumed that the division is equal because it is a useful benchmark, but it is unlikely to characterize the behavior of married or cohabiting couples. 8 Table 1 presents sample means and standard errors for the three dependent variables. Each measure of income is expressed in thousands of dollars and is deflated by the gross domestic product implicit price deflator, with 1996 as the base year. The mean level of log income is the same, regardless of whether I used Fuchs's scale or the NRC measure to adjust for adult equivalents. Table 1 also reports summary statistics for the explanatory variables. I controlled for the respondent's age (and higher-order terms), dummy variables indicating whether the respondent was black or Hispanic (with nonblack, non-Hispanic the omitted group), the respondent's highest grade completed, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was enrolled in school during the calendar year, and the number of weeks that the respondent worked during the year. I also included dummy variables indicating whether children were present in the household, whether the respondent lived with his or her parents, and the calendar year (with 1985 the omitted year).
Explanatory Variables
The covariates related to marital status include dummy variables indicating whether the respondent was single or cohabiting, with married the omitted group. Married respondents were identified via questions on marital status that were asked in every NLSY79 interview. In the 1979-1981 interviews, cohabitors were identified indirectly from the household roster: any respondent who lived with one unrelated, opposite-sex adult was assumed to be cohabiting. In 1982-1986, respondents with this living arrangement who reported that they were not married were asked directly whether they lived with a partner. From 1987 onward, all unmarried respondents were asked if they were cohabiting as a follow-up to the questions on marital status. 9 The remaining marriage-related covariates are the current durations of each single, cohabiting, and marriage spell. I measured the duration of single spells from the respondent's 20th birthday onward. Starting dates of cohabitation spells were not reported prior to 1990, so I assumed that early cohabitation spells began midway between the interview dates.
8. An alternative measure of income is A · Y 0 / AE, which is consistent with each adult consuming his or her own income adjusted for his or her share of adult equivalents (e.g., Fuchs 1986a Fuchs , 1986b . Because own income proves to change relatively little when individuals marry and cohabit, changes in this "no-sharing" measure are driven almost entirely by the addition of children to the household. 9. These changes in measurement do not affect the estimated effect of cohabitation on log income. I estimated a version of each income model in which the coefficient for the cohabiting dummy variable was allowed to vary over the three periods (1979-1981, 1982-1986, and 1987-2000) . In all cases, I failed to reject the null hypothesis that the three coefficients are equal.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides preliminary evidence on the relationship between annual income and marital status. The mean family income of married respondents is $53,437, which is almost three times as much as the mean income for single individuals and 20% more than the mean income for cohabitors. Adjusting for adult equivalents reduces the mean family income among married respondents to $25,318-a change that is consistent with a typical family having two adults and one child-and reduces the unconditional income premium associated with marriage. With family size taken into account, the married respondents' mean family income exceeds the corresponding means for single and cohabiting respondents by only 46% and 15%, respectively. One goal of the ensuing analysis Notes: Each income measure is expressed in thousands of dollars, divided by the gross domestic product implicit price deflator (1996 = 1.00). Each model also includes higher-order terms in age and dummy variables for each calendar year. Standard errors account for the nonindependence of observations within person-specific clusters.
was to determine how much of this difference in income remains after observed and unobserved factors that are correlated with marital status are taken into account. Table 2 also reveals that the average, individual income among married men is $34,436. This figure exceeds the mean income levels for single and cohabiting men by 80% and 50%, respectively. At the same time, the mean income for married women is only 12% higher than the mean for single women and is 3% lower than the mean for cohabiting women. Even though these statistics do not identify the causal effects of marriage and cohabitation on income, they highlight the fact that any gains in productivity that are realized by men are likely to come at the expense of the men's partners' income. Another goal of the multivariate analysis is to learn whether changes in own income constitute significant gains to marriage and cohabitation and how these gains compare to the benefits of pooling two adults' incomes.
Multivariate Results
I first estimate Models 1 and 2 using the log of family income per adult equivalent (Y F / AE) as the dependent variable, where adult equivalent is defined by Fuchs's (1986a Fuchs's ( , 1986b scale. Table 3 reports the predicted changes in log income that are associated with single-to-cohabiting, single-to-married, and cohabiting-to-married transitions. Additional estimates for each model are in the Appendix.
The right-most column of Table 3 contains my preferred estimates of the effects of marital transitions on the financial status of men and women. These difference estimates are unaffected by the correlation between marital status and unobserved, fixed effects. In addition, they are based on Model 2, which allows marital status to affect both the level and slope of the log-income path. I predict that single women gain 0.440 in log family income when they cohabit and 0.416 when they marry. 10 The difference between these two estimates is statistically indistinguishable from zero at a 5% level of significance. I predict that single men have the same total family income per adult equivalent, regardless of whether they are single, cohabiting, or married. On the basis of these estimates, I conclude 10. To compute predicted changes in log income for Model 2, I assumed that individuals spent three years in the previous state (single or cohabiting) and had been in their current state for one year. that marriage and cohabitation confer sizable-and identical-financial benefits on women, while men "break even" upon entering either type of union.
Before I explore the sources of these predicted changes in financial status, I return to two specification issues raised earlier. First, the evidence in Table 3 indicates that the estimated gain to marriage is overstated when unobserved, fixed effects are not taken into account. Using OLS estimates for Model 2, I predict that single women gain 0.437 in log family income when they cohabit and 0.542 when they marry; the corresponding figures for men are 0.116 and 0.220. The change in predicted log income associated with cohabitation-to-marriage transitions-which I constrained to be equal for men and women-is 0.108. 11 If these estimated effects could be considered causal, I would conclude that marriage leads to an income premium that is 10 percentage points larger than the substantial gain in income that is associated with cohabitation. However, this additional marriage premium disappeared once I differenced the data because it is due to unobserved, time-invariant factors that vary systematically with marital status.
The difference estimates represent causal effects only if individuals' marital-status decisions are also independent of time-varying unobservables that influence log income. To test the assumption that the dummy variables S it and C it are exogenous, conditional on the fixed effects, I used the strategy described earlier-that is, I reestimated the differenced version of Model 2 after I added dummy variables indicating whether the individual was 11. Because Models 1 and 2 use two parameters to estimate three transitions, the predicted effect of singleto-cohabiting transitions is constrained to be the difference between the predicted changes for the other two transitions. I tested this overidentifying restriction in the differenced version of each model by adding a parameter (α sc ) that identifies the change in log wages that is associated with single-to-cohabiting transitions. For every specification presented in this article, I failed to reject the null hypothesis α sc = α c -α s at a 5% level of significance; the smallest p value I obtained is .119. Table A1 . Adult equivalent is defined by Fuchs's scale. Model 2 estimates assume that the completed duration in the last state is three years and that the duration in the current state is one year. Standard errors of predictions are in parentheses. single or cohabiting in each of the three succeeding calendar years. These dummy variables are expected to have statistically significant coefficients only if they are correlated with time-varying components of the residual. I tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients for these lead values are jointly zero; the p values are .902 for men and .278 for women. This result indicates that the difference estimates are free of endogeneity bias.
The second specification issue concerns the contrast between Models 1 and 2. Model 1 constrains the slope of the log-income path to be invariant to marital status. Table 3 indicates that this restriction has no effect on the predicted log-income gaps for men, but reduces women's predicted gains to cohabiting or marrying by five log points (although this prediction depends on assumed durations of unions). 12 Putting aside the implied gender difference for the moment, the bottom line is that income gains to marriage and cohabitation change little with union duration. This finding is in direct contrast to the finding that men's wages grow more rapidly after marriage (Korenman and Neumark 1991; Loh 1996; Stratton 2002) . As I demonstrate later, changes in needs-adjusted family income are dominated by the addition of partners' income and changes in family size. Both factors lead to large, contemporaneous effects on log-income levels that dwarf any subsequent changes. Moreover, with annual family income as the dependent variable, the gains to marriage and cohabitation also reflect changes in the labor supply that are related to marital status. This dimension explains the gender difference revealed by Model 2. The parameter estimates in Appendix Table A1 show that single women receive more income growth than do married women. After I examined the components of annual income more closely, I attributed most of this differential growth to greater work effort among single women, not to differences in average hourly wages and nonlabor income. This finding is consistent with evidence that women reduce their work effort upon marrying and, especially, upon having children (Angrist and Evans 1998; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Waldfogel 1997 ).
Next, I assessed the contribution of intrahousehold specialization to the financial gains associated with union formation. To isolate the effect of specialization, I reestimated Model 2 using the respondents' own income, unadjusted for adult equivalents, as the dependent variable. The difference estimates in Table 4 reveal that women's predicted own income declines by 8% when women move from cohabitation to marriage and by 13% when they move directly from being single to married. When men make the same transitions, their income is predicted to increase by 3%-4%, although these gains are imprecisely estimated. (Because own income is not shared, I no longer constrained the estimated cohabitation-to-marriage effects to be identical for men and women.) Both men and women see their own-income levels change by negligible, statistically insignificant amounts when they form cohabiting unions.
I draw three conclusions from the "own-income" estimates in Table 4 . First, married couples continue to choose a division of labor that augments men's labor-market earnings but detracts from women's. Second, specialization is more pronounced among married couples than among cohabiting couples. These findings are consistent with evidence that men receive a small wage premium upon marrying (Daniel 1995a (Daniel , 1995b Gray 1997; Korenman and Neumark 1991; Loh 1996; Stratton 2002 ) that exceeds the premium associated with cohabiting (Daniel 1995a , Stratton 2002 . 13 Finally, I conclude that gains to 12. I failed to reject the null hypothesis that the slope of the log-income path is identical for single, cohabiting, and married men (γ s = γ c = γ m ); the p value is .654 for the OLS estimates and .252 for the difference estimates. For women, the corresponding p values are both less than .005. 13. To my knowledge, only Daniel (1995a Daniel ( , 1995b provided parallel evidence on the causal effect of marriage and cohabitation on women's wages. (As I noted earlier, several studies have identified causal effects of motherhood on women's wages.) Daniel reported that white women's wages are unaffected by marital status, whereas black women receive a small wage premium when they marry (but not when they cohabit). Because Daniel presented few details about his data and model specification, it is difficult to reconcile his findings with mine. specialization are a minor part of men's and especially women's overall income gains. A single woman is predicted to gain 52% (exp(0.416) -1) in effective income upon marrying, even though her own income falls by 13%. The fact that intrahousehold specialization allows her husband to earn 3% more than he otherwise would is not the driving force behind her financial gain.
Although specialization is not a major source of the income gain associated with union formation, gaining access to another adult's income is important for both men and women. To demonstrate this claim, I reestimated Model 2 using the log of total family income unadjusted for adult equivalents as the dependent variable. Each predicted change in needs-adjusted income shown in Table 3 reflects a change in the log of total family income (log(Y F )) net of a corresponding change in the log of adult equivalents (log(AE)). By comparing predictions that use log(Y F / AE) and log(Y F ) as dependent variables, I could decompose the former into its components.
The right-hand columns of Table 4 show predicted changes in the log of total family income that are associated with each marital-status transition. The predictions reveal that both men and women receive substantial gains in total family income when they form unions. With regard to the difference estimates in Table 4 , the predicted effect of singleto-cohabiting transitions on log income is 0.959 for women and 0.532 for men. The predicted changes associated with single-to-married transitions are only slightly smaller (0.934 for women and 0.506 for men), while the predicted change associated with cohabiting-to-married transitions is not significantly different from zero. These gains are due largely to the addition of a second adult's income to the family total. They are Notes: Estimates that were used to compute these predictions are available from the author. Estimates are for Model 2 and assume that the completed duration in the last state is three years and that the duration in the current state is one year. Standard errors of predictions are in parentheses.
consistent with the fact that "breadwinner-homemaker" specialization has given way to increasingly collaborative unions in which women make significant contributions to family income. The predicted changes in log income that are shown in Table 4 correspond to a female-male income ratio of 0.60-0.70, which is close to the gender ratio in wages and earnings reported elsewhere (e.g., Blau 1998) . Table 5 contains transformations of the same predicted changes shown Tables 3 and 4 . The top row gives the predicted changes in total family income. For example, women making single-to-cohabiting transitions are predicted to gain 0.959 in log income, and Table 5 shows this gain as a 161% change in income (exp(0.959) -1). The second row of Table 5 reports predicted percentage changes in family income per adult equivalent. For example, the predicted change of 0.440 for women who are making single-to-cohabiting transitions (Table 3 ) appears in Table 5 as a 55% increase in income (exp(0.440) -1). The third row shows predicted percentage changes in adult equivalents. If women gain 0.959 in total log income and 0.440 in needs-adjusted log income when they form cohabiting unions, their predicted change in log(AE) is 0.519 (0.959-0.440). This change appears in Table 5 as a 68% (exp(0.519) -1) change in adult equivalents. The bottom row of Table 5 shows predicted changes in own income, based on the estimates in Table 4 .
By comparing all four rows of estimates in Table 5 , I can offer the following conclusions. First, productivity enhancement accounts for an insubstantial portion of the gains to marriage. When single individuals marry, women's predicted income levels decrease by 13% while men's increase by 4%. Added together, a given male-female pair may or may not earn more income as a married couple than they would as single individuals-but any productivity-related gain pales in comparison to the expected gain in total income of 154% for women and 66% for men. The contrast is even starker for single-to-cohabitation transitions: women and men are predicted to gain 161% and 70% in total income, respectively, despite the fact that neither partner can expect his or her own income to change. Second, because the lion's share of the income premium comes from gaining another adult's income, women typically benefit far more than do men. Women receive a predicted 52%-55% gain in family income even after increased family size is taken into account, whereas men's increase in predicted family income is exactly offset by gains in family size. Third, because the estimated effects represent gains to "coupling," rather than gains to intrahousehold specialization, cohabiting couples receive at least as large a boost in income as do married couples. Married and cohabiting couples may differ in other dimensions, but my analysis indicates that men's and women's expected changes in financial status do not depend on the type of partnership they form. 
Checks for Robustness
I found that women gain slightly more than 50% in needs-adjusted family income when they cohabit or marry, whereas men neither gain nor lose effective income. To assess the sensitivity of these results to the measure of adult equivalents that I used, I reestimated the difference version of Model 2 with log(Y F / AE) as the dependent variable, but I considered the two alternative measures of adult equivalents defined earlier: the NRC measure and the per capita measure. The left-hand columns of Table 6 show the estimated effects of marital-status transitions on these alternative measures of log income per adult equivalent. In Table 7 , I used these estimates to reproduce a portion of the decomposition shown in Table 5 .
Using the NRC measure, I predict a 66%-70% increase in needs-adjusted income when single women move into cohabitation or marriage and a 5%-7% increase when single men do so. These numbers are slightly larger than the corresponding estimates (52%-55% for women and roughly zero for men) obtained with Fuchs's scale (1986a Fuchs's scale ( , 1986b . The NRC measure puts less weight on the second adult and more weight on each child than does Fuchs's measure. Because the former weight dominates (i.e., the addition of one adult is the modal, observed change in family size at the time of union formation), use of the NRC measure leads me to predict that both men and women gain needsadjusted income upon forming unions. When I switched to per capita family income, the predicted changes in needs-adjusted income are smaller than the corresponding estimates based on Fuchs's scale: Table 7 shows that women gain only 47%-50% in adjusted income when they cohabit or marry, whereas men lose 7%-9%. By weighting adults' and children's needs equally and not allowing for scale economies, the per capita measure Notes: Estimates that were used to compute these predictions are available from the author. All estimates are for differenced versions for Model 2 and assume that the completed duration in the last state is three years and that the duration in the current state is one year. Standard errors of predictions are in parentheses. understates gains in needs-adjusted income that are associated with gaining a partner. I cannot assess the merits of alternative measures of family need in the absence of detailed data on consumption, but it appears that reasonable alternatives to Fuchs's measure have relatively small effects on the estimates.
Previous research has pointed to significant racial differences in the wage effects of marriage and cohabitation (Daniel 1995a (Daniel , 1995b . Thus far in my analysis, I have constrained the income effects of marital transitions to be uniform across racial groups. To determine whether my estimates mask heterogeneity across races in the gains to cohabitation and marriage, I reestimated the differenced version of Model 2 for separate samples of black and nonblack, non-Hispanic ("white") respondents. 14 I used log(Y F / AE) as the dependent variable and Fuchs's measure of adult equivalents. Difference estimates for each race-specific sample appear in the right-hand columns of Table 6 .
The estimates in Table 6 indicate that blacks and whites receive virtually the same income premium when they cohabit and marry. The largest black-white difference is seen among men who transition from being single to being married: white men are predicted to lose 0.026 in log income, while black men are predicted to lose 0.101. However, neither coefficient is precisely estimated and, in fact, each racial difference shown in Table 6 is statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of significance. Other analysts (e.g., Daniel 1995a Daniel , 1995b have suggested that blacks and whites receive different gains in own income upon forming unions, presumably because of racial differences in intrahousehold specialization. My estimates indicate that expected changes in total income-which are due primarily to the addition of a partner's income-are similar for the average black and the average white individual.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
My investigation has revealed that union formation confers sizable financial benefits on women, but not on men. A portion of this conclusion is old hat, for evidence abounds that women gain financially upon marrying. What my investigation has highlighted, however, is that the average woman can expect to receive a virtually identical income premium, regardless of whether she cohabits or marries. Marriage appears to be more beneficial than cohabitation when self-selection is ignored, but the causal effects of marriage and cohabitation are indistinguishable. 14. Hispanic respondents account for only 15% of the person-year observations and only 147 cohabitationto-marriage transitions, so I excluded them from the race-specific analysis. My conclusion that men neither gain nor lose financial status upon forming unions is more surprising. Analysts have tended to focus on evidence that marriage makes men (slightly) more productive in the labor market than their nonmarried counterparts, but it is incorrect to interpret this gain to intrahousehold specialization as an improvement in men's financial well-being. After all, men are destined to lose financially if their families' division of labor is sufficiently extreme-a man's family need increases substantially (on the order of 70%) when an adult partner joins his household, and no reasonable amount of productivity enhancement will increase his earnings enough to offset that change. My evidence shows that in an era when intrahousehold specialization has diminished and women's income contributions have increased, men can be expected to break even financially upon marrying or cohabiting.
I conclude by considering one final question: Do gains in total family income per adult equivalent matter? On the one hand, this outcome comes closer to capturing the economic gains to union formation than do more limited measures, such as average hourly wages and hours worked. Moreover, it is easily measured and compared across families. If we are intent on cataloging the various dimensions on which marriage is beneficial to individuals, this is one outcome for which guesswork is unnecessary. As my analysis demonstrates, it is relatively straightforward to identify the causal effects of marriage and cohabitation on women's and men's financial well-being.
On the other hand, family income per adult equivalent does not measure individual consumption or well-being. It excludes the value of nonmarket time and assumes that effective income (which accounts for economies of scale and the presence of children) is shared equally among adult equivalents within the household. Relatively few couples are likely to use such a resource-allocation scheme, regardless of whether they are married or cohabiting. As I documented earlier, studies have consistently rejected a model in which couples maximize a single, joint-utility function (Browning et al. 1994; Lundberg et al. 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Thomas 1990; Winkler 1997) . Instead, they have indicated that intrafamily resource allocations are determined through bargaining. There is no evidence that "equal shares" is the dominant rule for married or cohabiting couples.
From a policy perspective, what matters most is how families use their income to acquire such shared goods as safe neighborhoods and schooling for their children, as well as individually consumed goods like health care. I believe that my analysis-as well as other research on the income effects of marital transitions-is a key component of a broader literature that focuses on these essential outcomes. If marital status is found to have a causal effect on these outcomes, the final question to be addressed is whether the effect arises as a result of the income premium gained by married and cohabiting women, or whether it exists even after income differences are taken into account. The answer to this question will reveal whether the link between marital status and income "matters," insofar as it fuels consumption-related outcomes, and whether married and cohabiting women exploit their income gains with equal success. Notes: All specifications also include dummy variables for each calendar year. Standard errors account for the nonindependence of observations within person-specific clusters.
